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ABSTRACT 
The announcement on December 23, 2003 that a dairy cow in the state of Washington 
was diagnosed as having ESE sent shock waves through the US beef industry. This research 
uses auction experiments to determine the pre- and post-ESE effects of traceability and country-
of-origin information on US consumer willingness to accept US and Canadian beef. The 
findings indicate that ESE has likely damaged US consumer demand for Canadian beef more 
than it has for US beef. The findings also indicate that most participants in the auction 
experiments would support the implementation of a mandatory animal identification program in 
the United States. 
Key words: willingness to accept, action experiments, beef, BSE 
HOW AN AMERICAN BSE CRISIS HAS AFFECTED THE VALUE OF 
TRACEABILITY AND COUNTRY-PF-ORIGIN CERTIFICATIONS 
IN THE U.S. BEEF INDUSTRy?1 
Introduction 
The announcement on December 23,2003 that a dairy cow in the state of Washington 
had been diagnosed with Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE or Mad-Cow Disease) was a 
watershed event for US livestock markets. Although US consumer demand for beef appeared to 
remain strong in the weeks following the event, US beef industry and US government recognized 
the need to move rapidly forward with plans to implement some type of traceability in US 
livestock systems. 
Traceability is a critical element for dealing with BSE.2 Although traceability cannot 
prevent the disease, once BSE is detected traceability is essential for tracking the source of the 
disease. Traditional inspection systems focus on eliminating pathogens in the food marketing 
chain, mostly at the processor and food preparation levels of the chain. Because BSE is thought 
to originate with contaminated farm-level inputs (feed), the farms where an infected animal has 
been must be identified together with any partner animals on those farms that may have also 
been infected through the same feed source. Animal identification (ill) is essential for tracking 
these movements. 
ISpecial thanks are given to David L. Dickinson for helpful comments on an earlier version of the 
manuscript and guidance in establishing protocols for the auction experiments. Thanks are also given to the Utah 
Agricultural Experiment Station and a National Research Initiative grant provided by USDA, CSREES for providing 
partial fmancial support for this research. 
2 Traceability is also essential for dealing with other animal disease control and eradication issues, 
addressing bio-terrorism concerns in the food chain, and narrowing the focus (limiting) of food recalls. 
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Support for the US Animal Identification Plan (USAIP), a plan suggested as a blueprint 
for implementing animal identification (ill) in the US by the summer of2005, began to build 
following the discovery of BSE in Canada (Alberta) in May 2003 and became quite general 
among US livestock producer groups after December 2003 (e.g., Breckendorf (2004); Lyon 
(2004); Denis (2004); Philippi (2004); and Smith (2004)). The apparently high level of support 
now enjoyed by the USAIP belies much of the discussion prior to May 2003 surrounding the 
possible implementation of traceability systems in the US meat system. Prior to 2003, these 
discussions centered on market solutions to the traceability issue and specifically the ability of 
firms to recapture costs incurred in implementing the systems, specifically if consumers were 
willingness to pay (WTP) for these additional costs through paying premiums for traceable meat 
products, and also how benefits and costs of traceability would be shared in the marketing chain 
(e.g., Wiemers (2001); Buhr (2002); Sparks (2002); Dickinson and Bailey (2002); Dickinson and 
Bailey (2003); and Bailey, Jones, and Dickinson (2002)). Although public discussion in the US 
since December 2003 has shifted somewhat away from proprietary interests such as WTP to now 
focus on public goods (e.g., animal disease control and eradication and bioterrorism), consumer 
acceptance of beef products and certifications made to consumers about beef products in light of 
BSE remain important issues. 
US livestock systems have lagged principal competitors and customers in the 
development of livestock traceability systems (Lewis (2001); Liddell and Bailey (2001); Bailey 
and Dickinson (2002)). For example, Canada implemented a mandatory cattle identification plan 
in the summer of2002 with oversight by the Canadian Cattle Identification Agency (CCIA) (see 
http://vv\,vvv.canadaid.comL). The European Union, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and Uruguay 
have either implemented animal traceability systems or are actively engaged in doing so (Baines 
and Davies (1998) and (2000); Lewis (2001); Liddell and Bailey (2001)). 
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Canada is an important case study for the US beef industry in relation to BSE because the 
US and Canadian beef systems are quite similar and because the US and Canada have 
traditionally competed in the same markets. Prior to May 2003, Canadian live cattle imports into 
the US accounted for as much as 8% of total US cattle slaughter but this was reduced to zero 
virtually overnight following the BSE case in Alberta. The CCIA's system provided valuable 
assistance in tracking the infected animal's movements, but Canada's borders remained closed to 
cattle and beef exporting to the US.3 Given that a traceability system was in place in Canada 
before the discovery of BSE there, one could ask if the Canadian traceability system should have 
been taken into account before the US made a decision to close the Canadian border to cattle and 
beef imports. Although legitimate animal health reasons may exist for border closures, did the 
discovery of BSE in Canada in May 2003 significantly impact US consumer demand for 
Canadian beef? The same question could be asked about foreign consumer demand for US beef 
exports following the December 2003 event. 
The purpose of this paper is to determine if traceability system can help preserve 
consumer demand following the discovery of BSE. We focus specifically on the US and 
examine whether consumer willingness to accept (WTA) non-traceable beef either imported 
from Canada or produced domestically changed following the US BSE case in December 2003. 
The question is whether or not traceability and country-or-origin information have 
become more valuable to American consumers since December 2003. This is an important issue 
because it has implications not only for beef markets but also for public policy. For example, as 
3 Boneless Canadian beef from animals less than 30 months of age resumed in September 2003 (Robb 
(2004)). 
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the US government and US meat industry move toward implementing the US AlP , the issue of 
who should pay for the system has become an important (Farm Foundation (2004)). This study 
presents results from two sets of auction experiments examining US consumer WT A non-
traceable beef from the US and Canada both before the US BSE case in December 2003 and after 
the US BSE announcement. The data allow for this comparison because one set of the auction 
experiments was serendipitously completed just prior to the December 2003 US BSE case and 
the other set of auction experiments was completed in January 2004. 
Past Work 
A substantial body of literature has examined how consumers value information about 
food products. The foundation for much of this work was laid by research that established the 
value of labeling products for attributes such as food safety (e.g., Caswell (1998); and Caswell 
and Padberg (1992); Huffman et al. (2003a)). This work suggested that consumer choices are 
influenced by the information provided by food labels. 
Other research has focused on the value of information on individual characteristics that 
could either be placed on labels or communicated to consumers in other ways.4 Recently a 
substantial body of research has focused on consumer acceptance of and government policy 
towards genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in food products (e.g., Rousu et al. (2004); 
Lusk, Roosen, and Fox (2003); Lusk and Fox (2002); Huffman et al. (2003a) and (2003b); and 
Caswell (2000)). Other studies have examined the possibility of adding value to commodity or 
food products by providing consumers information on a myriad of different single or bundled 
characteristics including certifying enhanced food safety, the processes used to produce food, the 
40ther methods of communications could include advertising, point of sale materials, etc. 
location where food was produced, or the certifying agency (e.g., Loureiro (2003); Loureiro and 
Umberger (2003); Dickinson and Bailey (2003); Dickinson and Bailey (2002)). 
Traceability is a unique form of information for a food product because it provides 
information as a single characteristic (e.g., provides the potential of legal recourse) but also is 
used as a method to verify other product characteristics (e.g., enhanced food safety, humane 
animal treatment, environmental responsibility, social responsibility, etc.). A few studies have 
addressed the issue of traceability directly and have found traceability to be a valuable 
characteristic in food products (e.g., Hobbs (1996a) and (1996b); Dickinson and Bailey (2002) 
and (2003); and Buhr (2002)). 
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While the studies mentioned above used various methods, they generally support the 
notion that information, including traceability, is valuable to consumers and other members of 
the marketing chain, they also indicate that many consumers express a willingness to pay for this 
additional information. The uniqueness of the problem addressed in this paper is that we 
examine consumer attitudes about traceability immediately preceding and immediately following 
a major food safety event (the American BSE case in December 2003). The data also help 
address a major policy question about whether or not American consumers are willing to pay for 
implementing an animal traceability system. Although traceability is a fundamental component 
of any livestock system attempting to deal with BSE, it is costly to implement (USAIP (2004); 
Sparks (2002); and Buhr (2002)). Consequently, measuring consumer attitudes about 
traceability can gauge political support for these systems and how costs for implementing the 
systems might be shared by the public and private sectors. 
Methods and Data 
We focus specifically on US consumers and examine whether consumer WT A non-
traceable beef, either imported from Canada or produced domestically, changed following the 
US BSE case. This approach was selected assuming that traceability will eventually be the 
imposed baseline standard in both the US and Canada and that WT A would measure what 
consumers would need to be paid to go back to the old, non-traceable system. 
Economic Experiments 
6 
Auction experiments were employed to measure US participants' WTA for non-traceable 
US beef and traceable and non-traceable Canadian beef. Auction experiments have been used to 
elicit willingness to pay (WTP) and WTA food product characteristics when publicly available 
data were not available or were prohibitively costly to gather (e.g., Huffman et al. (2003a) and 
(2003b); Dickinson and Bailey (2003) and (2002); Shogren, List, and Hayes (2000); Shogren et 
al. (1994a) and (1994b)). 
We follow basically the same design proposed by Shogren et al. (1994a) and used by 
Dickinson and Bailey (2002) and (2003). However, rather than eliciting bids from participants to 
"upgrade" a sandwich from a baseline to a different sandwich with enhanced characteristics, we 
provided participants with a baseline traceable US beef sandwich and then elicited their WT A an 
alternative sandwich that was non-traceable and/or consisted of imported Canadian beef. This 
WT A represents the discount in price necessary to entice the participant to accept what they 
perceive to be an inferior product compared to the baseline. 
Subjects were recruited from four different demographic groups at Utah State University 
in Logan, Utah USA. These cohorts included faculty members, students, professional employees 
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(non-faculty employees in professional positions such as accounting, human resource 
management, etc.), and classified employees (groundskeepers, food service workers, staff 
assistants, etc.). Subjects were recruited by announcements in class (students) and by email and 
announcement flyers that were distributed around campus. Four different experiments were held 
(one each for each cohort) with approximately 13-14 participants in each experiment. 
Experiments were conducted with individuals of similar socioeconomic characteristics (cohorts) 
in each individual experiment to lower the potential influence of socioeconomic status barriers 
within the group and to isolate the potential influence of socioeconomic characteristics on 
bidding behavior (Dickinson and Bailey (2002)). 
The first set of four experiments was held during the first week of December 2003 (pre-
BSE). A second set of four experiments was held during the last week of January 2004 (post-
BSE). The pre-BSE experiments were originally conducted to determine if providing certifying 
traceability in Canadian beef would make it more acceptable to American participants after the 
Canadian BSE case in May 2003. The US BSE case was announced on December 23, 2003, 
almost immediately after the first set of experiments had been conducted. Obviously, the 
December 23 rd announcement changed the market landscape for beef in the US. This was the 
motivation for conducting the post-BSE experiments in January 2004. As a result, quite by 
accident, a data set was developed that measured US participants' WT A almost immediately 
prior to the American BSE case and almost immediately thereafter. 
The steps followed in both the pre- and post-BSE sets of experiment were the following: 
Step 1: Subjects in the experiment were seated and told a lunch sitting in front of them, 
consisting of the baseline beef sandwich, chips, dessert, and drink was "free." The participants 
were also given $15 in cash at the beginning of the one-hour experiment. 
Step 2: Subjects were assigned an identification number to ensure anonymity of the data 
they provided. Participants were infonned verbally and also provided with written instructions5 
that indicated they would be allowed to bid for what they would require to be paid to "switch" 
their baseline sandwich for each of four alternative sandwiches. Subjects were told that for the 
baseline sandwich "certified infonnation is available that the beef in this sandwich can be traced 
back to the fann in the US where it originated and this beef has been inspected." The subjects 
were given the following infonnation about the alternative sandwiches in the experiment: 
Sandwich 1 - certified infonnation is available that the beef in this sandwich can be traced back 
to the fann where it originated. The beef in the sandwich has also been inspected and imported 
from Canada; Sandwich 2 - certified infonnation is available that the beef in this sandwich has 
been inspected and that it was imported from Canada; Sandwich 3 - certified infonnation is 
available that the beef in this sandwich has been inspected and that it originated in the USA; and 
Sandwich 4 - certified infonnation is available that this sandwich has been inspected. 
Step 3: Participants were infonned that they would be allowed to place anonymous bids 
for what they would need to be paid to give up their baseline sandwich for each of the four 
alternative sandwiches. To ensure that bids would be placed based only on the infonnation 
provided, the sandwiches were constructed so that the baseline and the four alternatives looked 
virtually identical. There is some discussion in the literature about whether nth -price auctions or 
2nd -price (Vickery) auctions elicit more accurate results about consumer demand. Parkhurst, 
Shogren, and Dickinson (2004) indicate that the average bids using either procedure should be 
the same and a Vickery (second-price) auction is used in our experiments. 
5The written instruction is available from the authors on request. 
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Step 4: After all questions had been answered, a trial auction using a baseline candy bar 
and asking participants to provide anonymous bids regarding the appropriate discount or, 
conversely, what they would need to be paid (WTA) to accept a different candy bar. The trial 
was designed to give participants experience regarding how the actual auctions would operate. 
There were two rounds of bidding for two candy bars. After both trials rounds were finished, 
random numbers were drawn to select the "binding" round and "binding" candy bar. Money and 
the candy were then exchanged for the binding candy bar. 
After answering additional questions following the trial auction, written bids were taken 
from each participant for Sandwich 1, then Sandwich 2, then Sandwich 3, and finally Sandwich 
4. Six total rounds were completed in order for the bid amounts to stabilize (e.g., Hayes et al 
(1995); Shogren et al. (2001); Dickinson and Bailey (2002) and (2003). The potential ''winner'' 
in any given round for any given sandwich was the person with the lowest bid. However, the 
potential payoff to the winner was the 2nd lowest bid (Vickery auction style). The "winning" bid 
for each sandwich (2nd lowest bid) was announced at the end of each round to provide 
participants with "market" information. Each participant's bid was recorded by an assistant at 
the end of each round so that data on every bid placed by each participant was preserved. 
Step 5: Following the completion of all six rounds, a round was selected at random as the 
binding round and a sandwich as the binding sandwich. This made the participant's every bid in 
every round a potentially binding bid. Participants were fully aware before the auction rounds 
commenced that this would be done. The person "winning" the randomly selected alternative 
sandwich in the binding round was paid the winning amount and the binding alternative 
sandwich was switched with the winner's baseline sandwich. 
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Step 6: Participants were asked to complete a survey6 eliciting not only socioeconomic 
information (age, gender education, income, etc.) about themselves and their family, but also 
other information that might influence bids. For example, participants were asked how many 
servings of beef they consumed each week, whether or not they made food purchasing decisions 
in their home, and whether or not a family member had become sufficiently ill from a of a food-
borne illness to require hospitalization. 
Comparisons of Pre- and Post-BSE Participants 
Table 1 presents the set of variables together with their descriptive statistics that were 
developed from the auctions and the survey responses and used in the analysis. Participants in 
both the pre- and post-BSE experimental auctions were also asked a battery of questions to 
determine their knowledge of specific characteristics relating to the Canadian BSE case in May 
2003 (e.g., province where BSE was found, number of infected animals found, when BSE was 
found, etc.) and were also asked about their general knowledge of BSE as a disease (e.g., how 
humans contract the disease, how BSE is diagnosed, etc.). A variable, BSECAN, was constructed 
as the percentage of correct answers the participant gave about the Canadian BSE crisis. Another 
variable, BSEKNOW, was constructed as the percentage of correct answers about BSE (Table 1). 
Although individual participants in the pre- and post-BSE sets of experiments were not 
identical, the same socioeconomic categories (faculty, students, professional employees, and 
classified employees) were used. Table 2 presents comparisons of the socioeconomic 
characteristics for the pre- and post-BSE groups. Table 2 reveals that only a few statistically 
significant differences existed between the pre- and post-BSE participants. These differences 
were that post-BSE participants were less likely to be married (MARRIED), less likely to do their 
6The survey instrument is available from the authors on request. 
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household's grocery shopping (SHOP), ate a greater percentage of their meals at home 
(ATHOME), were less motivated by food safety concerns when purchasing meat (FSIMP), and 
knew more about the Canadian BSE case than did pre-BSE participants (BSECAN) (Table 2). 
Whether animal identification in the US should be a voluntary or mandatory program has 
been a matter of discussion for some time but has become an especially important issue since 
December 23rd . We asked participants in the post-BSE auctions to indicate whether they 
believed animal identification in the US should be voluntary or mandatory. Most participants 
(69%) believe animal identification should be a mandatory program. Those believing animal 
identification should be voluntary in the US were statistically more certain about the quality of 
imported Canadian beef (TRUSTCAN), less likely to be in the medium income category 
(MIDINC), and knew less about the Canadian BSE case (BSECAN), and BSE in general (BSE) 
than did those desiring a mandatory program (Table 2). 
Regression Analysis 
Regression analysis was used to determine the participant characteristics, (age, gender, 
income, education, knowledge about BSE, past illness, etc.) that affected average WTA. The 
model's form was the following: 
(1) 
AVGBIDij =ao +aIFEMALEj +a2 AGEj +a3MARRIEDj +a4CHILDRENj +asSHOPj 
a 6ATHOME% j + a 7ILLNESSj + asPRIMPj + a 9FSIMPj + a10TRUSTUSj + au TRUSTCANj 
+a12 SOMECOLj +a13 COLLEGEj +aI4 POSTGRADj +alsMIDINCj +aI6 HIGHINCj w 
4 
+aI7 BSECANj +alsBSEKNOWj +aI9 BEFOREj + ~fJi-ISi +8ij 
i=2 
here variable names and descriptions are given in Table 1. The subscript "i" indicates the lh 
sandwich type (i=I, 2, 3, 4) and the subscript ''j'' is for the jth participant (j= 1,2, 3, ... , 113). 
Many of the variables in equation (1) are binary. The base regression was for WT A 
Sandwich 4 (S4), the non-traceable beef of unknown origin, by participants with less than a 
college education (SOMECOL), and in the lowest income category (LOW/NC). The parameter 
estimate on BEFORE ( a 19 ) is a test for whether or not average WT A alternative sandwiches 
changed after the US BSE case in December 2003. A significant negative value for BEFORE's 
parameter would indicate that WT A increased following the US BSE case. 
Results 
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Table 3 reports the average bids for WT A alternative sandwiches and an initial statistical 
analysis for differences in WTA between pre- and post-BSE auctions. The results presented in 
Table 3 indicate that WTA (S], S2, S3, and S4) is non-zero in all cases. This suggests that, on the 
average, a non-zero amount would need to be paid to participants to entice them to substitute 
their baseline sandwich for one of the alternative sandwiches. Average WTA was higher for S], 
S2, and S3 in the post-BSE auctions than in the pre-BSE auctions. However, a comparison of pre-
and post-BSE coefficients of variation (Table 3) that variability in WTA increased for S], S2, and 
S3 in the post-BSE than in the pre-BSE experiments. This provides evidence for increased 
uncertainty regarding the value of certifications for traceability and country of origin after the US 
BSE incident. This may help to explain why average bids to accept S4 declined as did the 
variability of bids for S4 in the post-BSE auctions compared to the pre-BSE auctions. It is 
probable that participants in the post-BSE experiments were simply less certain as a group about 
the value of different certifications after December 23rd than they were before December 23rd . 
WTA for S3, the sandwich providing US country-of-origin certification but not 
traceability, was barely statistically different than zero at the 10% level in the post-BSE 
experiments. A comparison of the pre- and post-BSE mean WTA the alternative sandwiches 
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reveals that, statistically speaking, WTA increased in the post-BSE auctions only for S} (Pre S) -
Post S} in Table 3), the traceable Canadian beef sandwich. At the time the post-BSE auctions 
were held, a public announcement had been made reporting that the BSE cow in the state of 
Washington was of Canadian origin. The results suggest that for the participants in these 
auctions the US BSE case likely hurt the reputation of Canadian beef more than it did US beef. 
This is based on that fact that, as a group, post-BSE participants exhibited weaker WTA for 
Canadian beef, even if it was traceable, than did pre-BSE participants. 
Table 4 reports the parameter estimates for a random-effects model of average WTA 
amounts required to entice participants to accept a non-baseline sandwich. The random effects 
model follows Dickinson and Bailey (2002) and (2003) and was selected after the Lagrange 
Multiplier (LM) and Hausman tests revealed that to be the appropriate estimation procedure 
(Table 4) (Greene). The regression analysis was necessary to account for socioeconomic and 
other participant characteristics that might affect participants' WT A the alternative sandwiches. 
Because this is a WT A model, the interpretation of a positive (negative) coefficient is that 
presence of that characteristic increases (decreases) what would need to be paid to the subj ect for 
them to accept one of the alternative sandwiches as a substitute for the baseline sandwich. 
Again, the baseline sandwich contains traceable, US beef. 
The results in Table 4 indicate that there is no firm statistical evidence to indicate that the 
WT A alternative sandwiches changed after the US BSE case (insignificant parameter estimate on 
BEFORE). However, the relatively large coefficient and standard error of the parameter estimate 
for BEFORE, implies a fair amount of variation in average WT A bids between pre- and post-
BSE participants (see Table 3) and supports the notion that uncertainty about WTA generally 
increased after December 23 rd . 
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The results reported in Table 4 also indicate that both traceability and country-of-origin 
information (S)) (even if the meat is imported) or knowing the beef was produced domestically 
(S3) were more acceptable to participants than simply knowing the meat was inspected (S4). 
These results confrrm both Loureiro and Umberger's findings (2003) that country-of-origin 
information is valuable to US consumers and Dickinson and Bailey's (2002) and (2003) findings 
that traceability is a valuable market characteristic. This implies that even though the overall 
reputation of Canadian beef has been damaged among our participants since the US ESE case 
(Table 3), traceability makes Canadian beef more acceptable than ifit is non-traceable. This is 
based on the insignificant parameter estimate for S2, the non-traceable Canadian beef, and the 
significant, negative parameter estimate for S), the traceable Canadian beef. 
Socioeconomic and other participant characteristic played a role in their WT A alternative 
sandwiches. Participants eating most of their meals at home (ATHOME) required more money 
to give up their baseline sandwich than did participants eating most of their meals away from 
home, on the average. This might suggest that persons eating away from home expect vendors to 
provide implicit assurances while those eating mostly at home have a greater sense of 
responsibility about choosing the assurances they desire. 
Persons with high degrees of trust in the US government inspections (TRUSTGOV) were 
more likely to substitute their baseline sandwich freely among the alternative sandwiches than 
were participants with less trust of US government inspection. This suggests that certifications 
beyond simple government inspection (i.e., traceability and country of origin) are simply not as 
important to this group as they were to people with less trust in the US government. Similarly, 
the older the participant (AGE) the more willing he/she was to substitute the baseline sandwich 
for one of the alternative sandwiches. This suggests that traceability and country-or-origin 
certifications were more important to younger participants than they were to older participants. 
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Participants with post-graduate education (POSTGRAD) needed to be paid more to 
switch the baseline sandwich for one of the alternatives than participants with less education. 
Income was not found to influence average WTA. Thompson (1998) notes similar results in his 
study of WTP for organic food certifications when he suggests that income may not be related to 
organic food purchases. 
Knowledge of the Canadian BSE case (BSECAN) did not significantly affect WTA. 
However, knowledge about BSE in general (BSEKNOW) had a positive effect on WTA. This 
suggests that persons with above average knowledge about scientific matters concerning BSE 
valued traceability and country of origin information more than participants with less knowledge 
about BSE. This implies that educating people about BSE from a scientific perspective will 
likely result in more support for traceability and country of origin programs. 
A logistical regression was used to determine if any of the socioeconomic and other 
characteristics indicated in equation (1) affected whether or not participants in the post-BSE 
auctions supported voluntary or mandatory animal ill programs in the US7 The logit analysis 
indicated that none of the socioeconomic characteristics of participants, except for TR USTCAN, 
influenced the probability of a participant favoring mandatory animal ill programs in the US. 
TRUSTCAN increased the probability of a participant favoring mandatory ill. This is not 
surprising because the Canadian animal ill system is mandatory and if a participant trusted the 
Canadian system, they would likely favor a similar system in the US. 
7The full set of logistical regression results is available from the authors by request. 
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The results suggest that support for mandatory ill among the participants is widespread 
(69% of participants) and is not determined by demographic their characteristics. Given the 
average WTA is non-zero, the results provide some evidence for a large number of US 
consumers being willing to support the implementation of a mandatory animal ill program with 
tax dollars. Of course, these results should be confirmed with a broader probability study. 
Conclusions 
A series of experimental auctions were conducted immediately preceding and following 
the announcement on December 23,2003 that a cow in the state of Washington had been 
diagnosed with BSE. The data set offers some unique insights into the effects of BSE on beef 
demand in the US because it provides a snapshot of demand for a set of American consumers on 
both sides of a major food safety event. 
The results indicate that information about traceability and country of origin is valuable 
to consumers. They also suggest that greater uncertainty about certifications and assurances for 
beef existed among the participants after December 23 rd than before December 23 rd. While this 
is not surprising, it indicates that US consumers, while not necessarily changing beef buying 
habits, were subject to some "shock" to their overall perceptions about beef and certifications 
and assurances about beef. 
Perhaps one of the most important findings was that participants' demand for Canadian 
beef was more adversely affected by the US BSE crisis than was the demand for US beef. This 
implies that US consumers have placed at least some of the "blame" for the US BSE incident on 
Canada because the subj ect animal was born there. 
The results suggest that a large percentage of US consumers would support a mandatory 
animal ill system in the US and would be willing to pay something for it. Additional work is 
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needed to confinn these results. However, they confinn that the US BSE case caused some 
important changes in American consumer attitudes. Consequently, the US beef industry should 
not assume that because no noticeable change in US consumer demand for beef occurred after 
December 23,2003. Consumers are more uncertain about beef products than they were prior to 
December 23rd . Additional BSE cases could exacerbate this uncertainty. The movement toward 
animal ill systems appears to be a good strategic move by the US beef industry and the US 
government, based on participants' stated support for such systems. 
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Table 1. Variable Names and Descriptions. 
Variable Description Mean Std.Dev. 
AVGBID Average of bid for all six rounds for all sandwiches 2.479 8.236 
FEMALE Female =1,0 otherwise 49.6% 50.1% 
AGE Age of subject in years 35.319 11.593 
MARRIED Married = 1, 0 otherwise 72.3% 44.8% 
CHILDREN Presence of children in household under 18 = 1, 0 otherwise 43.4% 49.6% 
SERVINGS Number of times beef Eroducts are eaten each week. 3.058 1.810 
SHOP Primary grocery shoEEer in household = 1, 0 otherwise 62.2% 48.6% 
A THOME Over 50% of meals 2re2ared at home =1,0 otherwise 92.0% 27.1% 
ILLNESS In past five years someone in household or immediate 33.0% 47.1% 
family suffered from a food borne illness = 1, 0 otherwise 
PRIMP Ranked price as first or second (out of 6) most important 50.5% 50.1% 
determinant of meat Eurchases = 1, 0 otherwise 
FSIMP Ranked "safety of meat" as first or second (out of 6) most 45.0% 49.8% 
important determinant of meat purchases = 1, 0 otherwise 
TRUSTUS On a 5 point scale with 5 being "very good assurance" and 1 82.1% 38.3% 
indicating "no assurance", rated "USDA inspection" as a 4 
or above = 1, 0 otherwise 
TRUSTCAN On a 5 point scale with 5 being "very good assurance" and 1 20.5% 40.4% 
indicating "no assurance", rated "Imported from Canada" as 
a 4 or above = 1, 0 otherwise 
SOMECOL Less than a bachelors degree has been achieved = 1, 0 33.6% 47.3% 
otherwise 
COLLEGE Bachelors degree is the highest level of education achieved 31.9% 46.6% 
= 1, 0 otherwise 
POSTGRAD Graduate degree is the highest level of education achieved 34.5% 47.6% 
= 1, 0 otherwise 
LOWINC Household income is < $30,000 =1,0 otherwise 40.2% 49.1% 
MIDINC Household income is $30,000 - $59,999 =1, 0 otherwise 33.0% 47.1% 
HIGHINC Household income is $60,000+ =1,0 otherwise 26.8% 44.3% 
BSECAN Score on a test about knowledge ofBSE incidence(s) in 43.5% 27.0% 
U.S. and Canada (note: for experiments before outbreak in 
U.S. questions dealt with the Canadian incidence.) 
BSEKNOW Score on test about scientific knowledge of BSE 55.6% 27.2% 
Sandwich 1 Certified information is available that the beef in this 
(S]) sandwich can be traced back to the farm where is originated 
and has been inspected and imported from Canada=l, 0 
otherwise 
Sandwich 2 Certified information is available that the beef in this 
(S2) sandwich has been inspected and imported from Canada= 1, 
o otherwise 
Sandwich 3 Certified information is available that the beef in this 
(S3) sandwich has been inspected and that it originated in the 
U.S.=I, 0 otherwise 
Sandwich 4 Certified information is available that the beef in this 
(S4) sandwich has been inspected = 1, 0 otherwise 
ANIMID Animal ID system should be mandatory = 1, voluntary =0 69.1% 46.3% 
(note: only asked for groups after BSE in U.S.) 
BEFORE Subject from experiment before BSE outbreak in U.S.=I, 0 51.3% 50.0% 
otherwise 
Table 2. Overall Means for Variables Included in the Study Together with Tests for 
Significant Differences (10 % Level of Significance) Between Pre- and Post-BSE 
Experimental Groups and Between Participants in Favor of a Voluntary or Mandatory 
AnimalID System in the US. 
Variable Mean Change after BSE Mean for Mandatory in U.S. a vs. voluntary b 
FEMALE 49.6% n/c C n/c 
AGE 35.319 n/c n/c 
MARRIED 72.3% n/c 
CHILDREN 43.4% n/c n/c 
SERVINGS 305.8% n/c n/c 
SHOP 62.2% n/c 
A THOME 92.0% n/c n/c 
ILLNESS 33.0% n/c n/c 
PRIMP 50.5% n/c n/c 
FSIMP 45.0% n/c 
TRUSTUS 82.1% n/c n/c 
TRUSTCAN 20.5% n/c 
HIGHSCHOOL 33.6% n/c n/c 
COLLEGE 31.9% n/c n/c 
POSTGRAD 34.5% n/c n/c 
LOWINC 40.2% n/c n/c 
MIDINC 33.0% n/c n/c 
HIGHINC 26.8% n/c n/c 
BSECAN 43.5% + + 
BSEKNOW 55.6% n/c + 
a + (_) indicates significant increase (decrease) in means for subjects after the BSE incidence in 
the U.S. 
b + (_) indicates significant higher (lower) means for subj ects favoring mandatory animal ill 
systems. It should be noted that only subjects after the BSE incidence in the U.S. were asked 
this question. 
C n/c indicates no significant change in means of two groups. 
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Table 3. WTA Average Bids and Statistical Comparisons for Pre- and Post-BSE Auctions. 
Variable(s) Mean Standard Coefficient t-statistic 
Deviation of Variation 
Combined Experiments: 
S] $1.48 2.740 185% 5.743*** 
S2 $3.07 10.873 354% 3.000*** 
S3 $l.86 8.455 455% 2.349** 
S4 $3.50 8.550 244% 4.356*** 
N=113 
Pre-BSE Experiments: 
S] $l.12 l.902 170% 4.503*** 
S2 $l.89 4.000 212% 3.611 *** 
S3 $l.12 2.860 255% 2.970*** 
S4 $3.92 1l.216 286% 2.665*** 
N=58 
Post-BSE Experiments: 
S] $l.86 3.388 182% 4.064*** 
S2 $4.30 15.011 349% 2.126** 
S3 $2.65 1l.764 444% l.673* 
S4 $3.06 4.295 140% 5.284*** 
N=55 
Comparisons Pre- and 
Post-BSE: Prob of> ta 
Pre S] - Post S] 0.082 
Pre S2 - Post S2 0.124 
Pre S3 - Post S3 0.175 
Pre S3 - Post S4 0.293 
*** Denotes statistically different than zero at the 1 % level. 
** Denotes statistically different than zero at the 5% level. 
* Denotes statistically different than zero at the 1 % level. 
a One-tailed t-test of significance. 
Table 4. Random Effects Estimation Results (Dependent Variable = Subject's Average 
Subject Bid Over Six Auction Rounds). 
Variable Coefficient a Standard Error 
Lagrange multiplier test 31.96*** 
Hausman test 30.45 
R2 
.095 
Number of observations 452 
Constant 12.121 *** 2.504 
FEMALE 0.573 1.048 
AGE 
-0.182 *** 0.045 
MARRIED 
-0.004 0.004 
CHILDREN 2.820 *** 0.986 
SERVINGS 0.169 0.234 
SHOP 0.003 0.003 
A THOME 
-7.455 *** 1.650 
ILLNESS 0.005 0.004 
PRIMP 
-0.133 0.557 
FSIMP 0.130 0.557 
TRUSTUS 0.000 0.005 
TRUSTCAN 0.000 0.004 
Education b 
COLLEGE 0.953 1.153 
POSTGRAD 2.981 ** 1.293 
Income C 
MIDINC 
-0.980 0.635 
HIGHINC 0.978 0.635 
BSECAN 
-2.800 1.980 
BSEKNOW 5.391 *** 1.683 
Meat Characteristics d 
Sandwich 1 (S 1) 
-2.022 ** 0.954 
Sandwich 2 (S2) 
-0.436 0.954 
Sandwich 3 (S3) 
-1.639 * 0.954 
BEFORE 
-0.884 0.836 
a ***=.01 significance, **=.05 significance and *=.10 significance. 
b Base is high school highest education degree. 
C Base is low income (household income < $30,000). 
d Base is sandwich 4 (S4=meat has been inspected). 
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